In contrast with procedures in previous Ebola outbreaks, patient care during the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, was centralized for a large number of patients. On 4 May, before the diagnosis of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) was confirmed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an isolation ward was created at Kikwit General Hospital. On 11 May, an international scientific and technical committee established as a priority the improvement of hygienic conditions in the hospital and the protection of health care workers and family members; to this end, protective equipment was distributed and barrier-nursing techniques were implemented. For patients living far from Kikwit, home care was organized. Initially, hospitalized patients were given only oral treatments; however, toward the end of the epidemic, infusions and better nutritional support were given, and 8 patients received blood from convalescent EHF patients. Only 1 of the transfusion patients died (12.5%). It is expected that with improved medical care, the case fatality rate of EHF could be reduced.
Ebola virus persistence was examined in body fluids from 12 convalescent patients by virus isolation and reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) during the 1995 Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Virus RNA could be detected for up to 33 days in vaginal, rectal, and conjunctival swabs of 1 patient and up to 101 days in the seminal fluid of 4 patients. Infectious virus was detected in 1 seminal fluid sample obtained 82 days after disease onset. Sequence analysis of an RT-PCR fragment of the most variable region of the glycoprotein gene amplified from 9 patients revealed no nucleotide changes. The patient samples were selected so that they would include some from a suspected line of transmission with at least three human-to-human passages, some from 5 survivors and 4 deceased patients, and 2 from patients who provided multiple samples through convalescence. There was no evidence of different virus variants cocirculating during the outbreak or of genetic variation accumulating during human-to-human passage or during prolonged persistence in individual patients.
From May to July 1995, a serologic and interview survey was conducted to describe Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) among personnel working in 5 hospitals and 26 health care centers in and around Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Job-specific attack rates estimated for Kikwit General Hospital, the epicenter of the EHF epidemic, were 31% for physicians, 11% for technicians/room attendants, 10% for nurses, and 4% for other workers. Among 402 workers who did not meet the EHF case definition, 12 had borderline positive antibody test results; subsequent specimens from 4 of these tested negative. Although an old infection with persistent Ebola antibody production or a recent atypical or asymptomatic infection cannot be ruled out, if they occur at all, they appear to be rare. This survey demonstrated that opportunities for transmission of Ebola virus to personnel in health facilities existed in Kikwit because blood and body fluid precautions were not being universally followed.
