Conflicts over the jurisdiction between tribal, state, and federal courts arise regularly due to the nature of overlapping sovereignty. The Supreme Court accepts an average of almost three Indian law cases a year and has decided more than twenty Indian law cases with a jurisdictional focus since 1978. As tribes become wealthier, they are increasingly acquiring new lands outside of their existing reservations. This expansion of territory generates new border zones where state and tribal interests converge. The Sixth Circuit recently decided the first federal appellate case dealing with the inherent criminal powers of tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct of Indians on tribal land that is located outside of the tribe’s reservation. The unanimous decision of the Sixth Circuit panel upheld the tribe’s inherent right to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but read into the opinion some limiting caveats that originate from civil, and not criminal, jurisdictional principles. This paper reads the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope as the first in what is surely to be a myriad of conflicts over the extraterritorial jurisdiction of tribal courts. It suggests that while the Sixth Circuit’s approach to tribal sovereignty is generally in keeping with Supreme Court precedent, the court erred by conflating criminal with civil authority and thus over limited its discussion of the inherent powers of tribal courts. Instead the paper suggests that a more consistent reading of the inherent extraterritorial criminal powers of Indian tribes should support jurisdiction over both tribal members and tribal territory unless Congress has expressly circumscribed tribal authority. This broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not only simpler to apply, but finds better support in Supreme Court precedent than the convoluted reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Conflicts over the jurisdiction between tribal, state, and federal courts arise regularly due to the nature of overlapping sovereignty. The Supreme Court accepts an average of almost three Indian law cases a year and has decided more than twenty Indian law cases with a jurisdictional focus since 1978. As tribes become wealthier, they are increasingly acquiring new lands outside of their existing reservations. This expansion of territory generates new border zones where state and tribal interests converge. The Sixth Circuit recently decided the first federal appellate case dealing with the inherent criminal powers of tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct of Indians on tribal land that is located outside of the tribe’s reservation. The unanimous decision of the Sixth Circuit panel upheld the tribe’s inherent right to extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but read into the opinion some limiting caveats that originate from civil, and not criminal, jurisdictional principles. This paper reads the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope as the first in what is surely to be a myriad of conflicts over the extraterritorial jurisdiction of tribal courts. It suggests that while the Sixth Circuit’s approach to tribal sovereignty is generally in keeping with Supreme Court precedent, the court erred by conflating criminal with civil authority and thus over limited its discussion of the inherent powers of tribal courts. Instead the paper suggests that a more consistent reading of the inherent extraterritorial criminal powers of Indian tribes should support jurisdiction over both tribal members and tribal territory unless Congress has expressly circumscribed tribal authority. This broader understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction is not only simpler to apply, but finds better support in Supreme Court precedent than the convoluted reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library Share: Permalink Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely Copy URL Copy DOI
While the Supreme Court regularly decides cases defining the limits of the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts, when it heard United States v. Cooley in 2021 it had not decided a case about the procedural powers of tribal law enforcement in more than a century. Across more than five decades lower courts at all levels struggled to decide whether the inherent criminal powers of tribal law enforcement are coterminous with the jurisdiction of tribal courts or whether tribal officers may have their own set of inherent powers distinct from the power to prosecute. This Article examines the inconsistent split in authority that existed before Cooley and anticipates the future misreading of inherent criminal power by lower courts. It argues that now that the Court has divorced the inherent criminal power of tribal law enforcement from the criminal jurisdictional power of tribal courts, tribal officers may stop, detain, search, and investigate anyone whose criminal conduct poses a danger to the health and welfare of the tribal community. The Article bolsters its application by using the first cases decided by lower courts in the post-Cooley era as artifacts to examine the full implications of the recognition of inherent criminal power exercised by tribal law enforcement.
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
The Global Financial Crisis precipitated a condensing of capital and a fall in global equities markets that resulted not solely in the necessity of government bailouts of the financial industry but also exposed a number of Ponzi schemes that collectively will cost investors tens of billions of dollars. With a new wave of litigation by innocent investors against Ponzi scheme operators just beginning, and likely to take years, it becomes important to clearly identify the methodologies used to value the loss and allocate existing assets among remaining creditors. To that end I offer this article to argue that courts ought to use a comparatively new approach – the loss to the losing victim methodology originally pioneered in criminal law – to determine how equally innocent victims share the losses these schemes precipitated. By standardizing the calculation of loss to investors in both criminal and civil law, the courts will not only make the determination of loss considerably easier, but also more equitable.
This article looks at the enforceability of the Extradition Clause in the federal courts of the United States. In 1861 the Supreme Court held in Dennison that the federal courts could not be used to enforce a request made by one state governor to another state governor for the extradition of a suspected criminal under Article IV Section 1. In 1987 the Supreme Court reversed the Dennison decision and for the first time since the Civil War held that the federal judicial power includes the power to enforce the Extradition Clause. This article takes the position that federal judicial power is limited to cases where the state governor has both territorial and personal jurisdiction over the accused. When an individual is on an Indian reservation, even Article IV does not authorize the governor of a state to enter the reservation and return the accused subject to an extradition request. Article IV’s Extradition Clause provides a constitutional duty for the executive of one state to remit to the power of a sister state someone located within its borders and subject to its jurisdiction. Critical to the exercise of this power is the dual understanding that the individual sought must be both within the state territory and subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Indian country lies outside the general jurisdictional power of the states. States may not enter Indian country and remove persons found there absent cooperation with or permission from the Tribe. Doing so infringes upon the Tribe’s right to make its own laws and be governed by them.
Since 1971 Indigenous Peoples in Alaska have been experimenting with a unique corporate form, the Alaska Native Corporation, or ANC. As 21st century corporate governance reformers look for alternatives to shareholder primacy, ANCs and their underlying autochthonous legal principles offer a solution to reimagine both shares and shareholders in ways that directly involve stakeholders in governance decisions. Traditional Indigenous principles do not separate labour from capital, and so when Indigenous People in Alaska were forced by the United States federal government to create corporations in order to manage their land and resources, they reimagined the fundamental nature of a corporation according to their own Indigenous traditions. The result is a form of corporate entity whose structure provides a model to traditional corporations and suggests a way forward for corporate governance reform. Modern corporations should learn from the innovations adopted by ANCs in order to make themselves both more sustainable and more responsive to the communities they serve.
Historically indigenous people have been mostly acted upon by corporations, but increasingly indigenous people are themselves emerging as corporate actors. With this emergence comes new perspectives on corporate law, corporate governance, and sustainability that reimagine the role of the shareholder, the responsibilities of the board, and the ethics of corporate action. Indigenous people enact their own autochthonous law to govern corporate behavior and enforce these laws in their own legal systems. As indigenous people emerge as corporate actors, they will learn from existing corporate behavior, but their chthonic approaches to corporate law and governance also have much to teach other communities about how to achieve sustainable corporate action. This chapter explores the unique indigenous perspective on corporations and sustainability.
