John Turri

University of Waterloo

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Experimental Evidence that Knowledge Entails Justification

SSRN Electronic Journal (2020)

John Turri

A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports further research that directly addresses these questions. Our findings support the hypothesis that knowledge entails justification on the ordinary view.

10.2139/ssrn.3652620

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Knowledge, Certainty and Assertion

John Turri

Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.

Certainty

Assertion

10.31219/osf.io/h7ba5

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Citations (6)

Moderate Scientism in Philosophy

John Turri

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.

Scientism

Experimental philosophy

10.31219/osf.io/8wfdc

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Citations (1)

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons

SSRN Electronic Journal (2009)

John Turri

Epistemic reasons are mental states, not propositions or non-mental facts.

10.2139/ssrn.3642925

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Citations (57)

How “ought” exceeds but implies “can”: Description and encouragement in moral judgment

Cognition (2017)

John Turri

Affect

10.1016/j.cognition.2017.07.008

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Citations (14)

Believing For a Reason

John Turri

This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. My thesis is that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes, and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.

Argument (complex analysis)

10.31219/osf.io/nmw5z

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Iffy predictions and proper expectations

Synthese (2013)

Matthew A. Benton John Turri

Philosophy of language

Successor cardinal

Speech act

10.1007/s11229-013-0377-y

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Citations (60)

Creative Reasoning

John Turri

I defend the unpopular view that inference can create justification. I call this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.

Creationism

10.31219/osf.io/xgsa3

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Reasons, Answers, and Goals

SSRN Electronic Journal (2012)

John Turri

I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals.

10.2139/ssrn.3643897

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From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments

John Turri

I review several theoretical and empirical developments relevant to assessing contemporary virtue epistemology’s theory of knowledge. What emerges is a leaner theory of knowledge that is more empirically adequate, better captures the ordinary conception of knowledge, and is ripe for cross-fertilization with cognitive science. I call this view abilism. Along the way I identify several topics for future research.

Epistemic virtue

Empirical Research

Empirical evidence

10.31219/osf.io/r5htu

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Citations (2)