Abstract This chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
£1486 (UK), €1886 (Europe), US$3251 (The Americas) US$3791 (Rest of the World) Prices are exclusive of tax.Asia-Pacifi c GST, Canadian GST and European VAT will be applied at the appropriate rates.For more information on current tax rates, please go to www.wileyonlinelibrary.com/tax-vat.The price includes online access to current content and all online back fi les to January 1st 2017, where
Institutional: £1486 (UK), €1886 (Europe), US$3251 (The Americas) US$3791 (Rest of the World)Prices are exclusive of tax.Asia-Pacifi c GST, Canadian GST and European VAT will be applied at the appropriate rates.For more information on current tax rates, please go to www.wileyonlinelibrary.com/tax-vat.The price includes online access to current content and all online back fi les to January 1st 2014, where
This chapter examines issues of distributive justice as it pertains to planning for pandemics and disasters. Pandemic plans assume that difficult decisions will need to be made about the allocation of scarce resources: vaccines, antimicrobials, hospital beds, and resource-intensive treatments such as ventilators or intensive care units. With the specter of pandemics and disasters such as 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, vaccine shortage, bird flu, SARS, and H1N1 in mind, the chapter explains how we are simultaneously both victims of disease and vectors of disease. It considers what justice requires in regard to both preparation and response, with particular reference to the question of whether scarce medical resources should be distributed preemptively, especially if they are never used. Yet, when investments in disaster preparedness are not adequately supplied with resources, the cost in lives and suffering can be significant. The chapter concludes by asking whether theoretical differences divide pandemic planning, where diseases can spread from person to person, from disaster planning more generally.
Abstract In pandemic planning, much attention has been paid to justice in the distribution of scarce health care resources: vaccines, anti-virals, and access to advanced modes of treatment such as ventilator support. This chapter examines critically the extent to which some proposals fail to take existing injustice into account. It considers the justice of pandemic planning, arguing that in order to be just, pandemic planning requires attention to basic health care infrastructure for everyone. Without, for example, access to basic primary care, people will be less likely to present for treatment and pandemic disease may not be identified at a time when spread is more readily preventable.