The tobacco industry's strong-arm tactics have been used consistently over many years. These tactics include: using the industry's size, wealth, and legal resources to intimidate individuals and local governmental bodies; setting up 'front groups' to make it appear that it has more allies than it really does; spending large sums of money to frame the public debate about smoking regulations around 'rights and liberty' rather than health and portraying its tobacco company adversaries as extremists; 'investing' thousands of dollars in campaign contributions to politicians; and using financial resources to influence science. These tactics are designed to produce delay, giving the nicotine cartel more time to collect even more profits at the direct expense of millions of lives around the world.
Author(s): Gottlieb, Mark; Sweda, Edward, Jr.; Guardino, Sara D. | Abstract: Abstract Cigarettes manufactured by fewer than half a dozen domestic companies cause approximately 440,000 deaths and $155 billion in medical and lost productivity costs each year in the United States. Despite this toll, Congress has not authorized the United States Food and Drug Administration to regulate cigarette design or marketing. Likewise, the Consumer Product Safety Commission cannot regulate cigarettes and the Federal Trade Commission has played a relatively passive role over the past two decades.Where legislative and regulatory approaches fail, courts have offered an alternative means of addressing the harm caused by cigarette manufacturers. Successful products liability lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers shift health and productivity costs of smoking from families and third-party payers back to cigarette companies, forcing increases in cigarette prices. Litigation thus has proven to be an effective public health strategy for reducing smoking.On September 22, 1999, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a lawsuit against the leading domestic cigarette manufacturers (collectively, “Defendants”) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. DOJ is seeking to stop the Defendants’ alleged decades-long misrepresentations and other fraudulent conduct under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO authorizes DOJ to pursue criminal and civil sanctions against individuals and organizations that are engaged in a conspiracy involving certain federal felonies, including mail and wire fraud. DOJ is pursuing RICO’s civil sanctions only in this lawsuit. This law synopsis provides an overview of the lawsuit and its possible outcomes, reviews the basic allegations against Defendants and their responses, reviews the remedies DOJ seeks, and covers important events during the litigation’s pre-trial phase. The synopsis also summarizes the manner in which the trial will proceed, reports key testimony provided thus far, and outlines the impact of possible outcomes.
Abstract Cigarettes manufactured by fewer than half a dozen domestic companies cause approximately 440,000 deaths and $155 billion in medical and lost productivity costs each year in the United States. Despite this toll, Congress has not authorized the United States Food and Drug Administration to regulate cigarette design or marketing. Likewise, the Consumer Product Safety Commission cannot regulate cigarettes and the Federal Trade Commission has played a relatively passive role over the past two decades. Where legislative and regulatory approaches fail, courts have offered an alternative means of addressing the harm caused by cigarette manufacturers. Successful products liability lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers shift health and productivity costs of smoking from families and third-party payers back to cigarette companies, forcing increases in cigarette prices. Litigation thus has proven to be an effective public health strategy for reducing smoking. On September 22, 1999, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ†) filed a lawsuit against the leading domestic cigarette manufacturers (collectively, “Defendants†) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. DOJ is seeking to stop the Defendants’ alleged decades-long misrepresentations and other fraudulent conduct under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO†). RICO authorizes DOJ to pursue criminal and civil sanctions against individuals and organizations that are engaged in a conspiracy involving certain federal felonies, including mail and wire fraud. DOJ is pursuing RICO’s civil sanctions only in this lawsuit. This law synopsis provides an overview of the lawsuit and its possible outcomes, reviews the basic allegations against Defendants and their responses, reviews the remedies DOJ seeks, and covers important events during the litigation’s pre-trial phase. The synopsis also summarizes the manner in which the trial will proceed, reports key testimony provided thus far, and outlines the impact of possible outcomes.
Formyl peptide receptor-like 1 (FPRL1) is an important classical chemoattractant receptor that is expressed in phagocytic cells in the peripheral blood and brain. Recently, various novel agonists have been identified from several origins, such as host-derived molecules. Activation of FPRL1 is closely related to inflammatory responses in the host defense mechanism and neurodegenerative disorders. In the present study we identified several novel peptides by screening hexapeptide libraries that inhibit the binding of one of FPRL1’s agonists (Trp-Lys-Tyr-Met-Val-d-Met-CONH2 (WKYMVm)) to its specific receptor, FPRL1, in RBL-2H3 cells. Among the novel peptides, Trp-Arg-Trp-Trp-Trp-Trp-CONH2 (WRWWWW (WRW4)) showed the most potent activity in terms of inhibiting WKYMVm binding to FPRL1. We also found that WRW4 inhibited the activation of FPRL1 by WKYMVm, resulting in the complete inhibition of the intracellular calcium increase, extracellular signal-regulated kinase activation, and chemotactic migration of cells toward WKYMVm. For the receptor specificity of WRW4 to the FPR family, we observed that WRW4 specifically inhibit the increase in intracellular calcium by the FPRL1 agonists MMK-1, amyloid β42 (Aβ42) peptide, and F peptide, but not by the FPR agonist, fMLF. To investigate the effect of WRW4 on endogenous FPRL1 ligand-induced cellular responses, we examined its effect on Aβ42 peptide in human neutrophils. Aβ42 peptide-induced superoxide generation and chemotactic migration of neutrophils were inhibited by WRW4, which also completely inhibited the internalization of Aβ42 peptide in human macrophages. WRW4 is the first specific FPRL1 antagonist and is expected to be useful in the study of FPRL1 signaling and in the development of drugs against FPRL1-related diseases.
Many smokers and potential smokers believe that light cigarette brands are less hazardous to their health than standard brands. As a result, millions of smokers have switched to light cigarettes instead of attempting to quit. For the same reason, light cigarettes are popular among new smokers, particularly youth. The truth, however, is that light cigarettes are not safer than other brands and are just as addictive. In 2001, the National Cancer Institute published an analysis of internal industry documents that appeared to show that the cigarette industry knew the truth about light cigarettes, but kept it secret. Further evidence of wrongdoing was revealed by the United States Department of Justice's lawsuit against the leading cigarette manufacturers. Federal District Court Judge Gladys Kessler, who presided over the case, made the follow key findings in August of 2006:
Background: For a quarter of a century, lawsuits have been filed on behalf of individuals who have been harmed by exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). Methods: A review of hundreds of legal cases where exposure to ETS was the basis for the lawsuit was undertaken. The history of ETS-based lawsuits was categorised and analysed. Results: While ETS-based lawsuits have arisen in a variety of divergent settings, there have been an increasing number of instances in which individuals have achieved relief from exposure to ETS and or monetary compensation for having been so exposed. Such successful outcomes make it easier for others to achieve similar results through litigation. Conclusion: Lawsuits will probably continue to be a viable remedy in assisting those being harmed by exposure to ETS, both inside and outside the USA.
Litigation is useful for both enforcing existing rights, and for showing the implications of legal principles derived from other types of cases to tobacco products.Thus :"Unfair" consumer practices are generally illegal, but only recently has this principle been applied to the factual context of cigarette sales to minors,1 or to the sales of "Joe Camel " promotional items without health warnings.2Manufacturers of products that cause more
