Higher world oil prices in the past decade have caused serious economic disruptions in most developing countries, which as a group are highly dependent on imported oil in relation to both the sizes of their economies and their total imports. I Increased oil bills have frequently led to lower aggregate growth rates, more severe balance-of-payments and debt problems, disruptions in energy-using sectors, and domestic inflation. Whether or not world oil prices resume their upward spiral, the oil-importing developing countries will continue to face serious macro-economic adjustment problems related in one way or another to energy.
In an earlier paper,' we showed that the value of shadow prices depends on how the government contemplates reequilibrating the economy to the perturbation associated with any project, except in the extreme case where the government has chosen all policy instruments optimally.Only under restrictive conditions will relative shadow prices for traded goods equal relative international prices.We develop here a general methodology for calculating shadow prices, which expresses the prices as a weighted average of domestic and international prices.The formulae provide the conditions under which the border price rule is valid.For instance, so long as there are non-traded goods, even if the government leaves tariffs unchanged (so that relative domestic prices of traded goods remain unchanged), unless the government completely neutralizes the induced change in domestic income, there will be changes in the prices of non-traded goods.These will preclude the use of the border price rule.
India and China contain about 40 percent of the earth's people. They are at an early stage of economic development, and their increasingly massive energy requirements will depend heavily on coal, a potent source of carbon dioxide, a powerful and long-lasting greenhouse gas. India also has important sources and uses of hydroelectric and nuclear power, petroleum, and natural gas. Agriculture still produces about 30 percent of its gross domestic product, and about 72 percent of the population lives in rural areas - with their large animal populations and substantial forest acreage. India has vast cities and an industrial sector that is large in absolute terms, although it represents only 30 percent of the economy. The model developed to analyze the economic effects of constraints on greenhouse gas emissions is a multisectoral, intertemporal linear programming model, driven by the optimization of the welfare of a representative consumer. A comprehensive model was built not to project the future at a single stroke but to begin to answer questions of aWhat if?form. The results strongly suggest that the economic effects on India of such constraints would be profound. The implications of different forms of emissions restrictions - annual, cumulative, and radiative forcing - deserve more attention. Cumulative restrictions - or better still, restrictions on radiative forcing - are closely related to public policy on greenhouse effects. Such restrictions also provide significant additional degrees of freedom for the economic adjustments required. They do this, in part, by allowing the postponement of emissions restrictions, which is not permitted by annual constraints. Of course, the question arises whether a country, having benefited from postponing a required reduction in emissions, would then be willing to face the consequences in economic losses. Might there be a genuine preference - albeit an irrational one - for taking the losses annually? Would compliance with international agreements for emissions restrictions be more likely if they required annual, rather than cumulative, reductions? Monitoring requirements would be the same in either case; if effective monitoring were carried out, it would detect departures from cumulative or radiative forcing constraints just as easily as departures from annualconstraints.
The present geographic pattern of investment in oil and gas exploration is skewed away from the developing countries and towards the developed countries. This paper presents statistical data relevant to this situation, analyzes its causes, and proposes solutions. The paper argues that this phenomenon is largely distributional, arising from continuing difficulties in reaching ‘equitable’ contractual agreements regarding the distribution of risks, benefits and costs, compounded by uncertainity about contract sancity. Both parties could gain if contracts were designed, on a country‐by‐country basis, to (1) take better advantage of comparative ability to assume different categories of risk; (2) ensure efficient project management; and (3) be more self‐enforcing.
The structure of taxes and fiscal contracts between host countries and foreign companies has major implications for the success of oil development projects. This is because of several key characteristics of such projects: large investment outlays, long lead times to project completion, and long periods of project output and payout. These characteristics usually are coupled with an incomplete sharing of information and technology, and significant differences in the ability of the various parties to bear the risks involved. These characteristics often lead to unstable contracts and, in many cases, to the failure to develop projects that are economically attractive in aggregate terms but unattractive to one or both parties because of uncertainties over sharing project risks and returns.