Federico Ciliberto

University of Virginia

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Jonathan W. Williams

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Gaurab Aryal

Boston University

Jūra Liaukonytė

Cornell University

Simon P. Anderson

University of Virginia

Carola Schenone

University of Virginia

Benjamin T. Leyden

Cornell University

Elie Tamer

Harvard University

Zhou Zhang

University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya

University of British Columbia

Edward Perry

Kansas State University

Cooperative Institutions

John Wiley & Sons (United States)

Hudson Institute

National Bureau of Economic Research

University of Virginia

RAND Corporation

Northwestern University

Centre for European Economic Research

University of California, Berkeley

Boston College

Pennsylvania State University

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Outsourcing and Vertical Integration in a Competitive Industry

Southern Economic Journal (2011)

Federico Ciliberto John C. Panzar

We develop a partial equilibrium, perfectly competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically integrated industry. There are three types of firms: upstream firms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate good; downstream firms that use primary factors and intermediate goods to produce a final good; and vertically integrated firms that do both. We establish conditions under which vertically integrated firms exist and outsource (part of) the production of the intermediate input. We study the changes in industry configurations resulting from changes in costs and demand.

Vertical Integration

Final good

Intermediate good

10.4284/0038-4038-77.4.885

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Citations (7)

Common-Subcontracting and Multimarket Contact in the Airline Industry

SSRN Electronic Journal (2020)

Gaurab Aryal Dennis J. Campbell Federico Ciliberto Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya

In the US airline industry, independent regional carriers fly passengers on behalf of different national airlines, giving rise to common subcontracting. On the one hand, we find that subcontracting is associated with lower prices, confirming the accepted notion that regional airlines can fly passengers at lower costs. On the other hand, we find that common subcontracting is associated with higher prices. These two countervailing effects suggest that the growth of regional carriers can have anticompetitive implications for the airline industry. In line with the literature, we continue to find that multimarket contact among national airlines is associated with higher prices.

10.2139/ssrn.3576044

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Network Structure and Consolidation in the U.S. Airline Industry, 1990-2015

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (2017)

Federico Ciliberto Emily E. Cook Jonathan W. Williams

We study the effect of consolidation on airline network connectivity using three measures of centrality from graph theory: Degree, Closeness, and Betweenness. Changes in these measures from 1990 to 2015 imply: i) the average airport services a greater proportion of possible routes, ii) the average origin airport is fewer stops away from any given destination, and iii) the average hub is less often along the shortest route between two other airports. Yet, we find the trend toward greater connectivity in the national network structure is largely una ffected by consolidation, in the form of mergers and codeshare agreements, during this period.

Consolidation

Closeness

Network Structure

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Are the Bankrupt Skies the Friendliest

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (2010)

Federico Ciliberto Carola Schenone

We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether firms that are under bankruptcy protection, as well as these firms' product market rivals, change the quality of the products they offer. We measure the quality of the services offered by a carrier using flight cancellations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We find that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. We also find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to permanently reduce the age of their fleet. We do not find evidence of statistically and economically significant changes by the airline's competitors along any of the dimensions above.

Competitor analysis

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Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation: Empirical Evidence from the Courts, 1890-2018

SSRN Electronic Journal (2024)

Federico Ciliberto

This study investigates the evolution of economic analysis in antitrust litigation using an original dataset encompassing all decided antitrust cases since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. Our analysis reveals three distinct breaks in the frequency of economists mentioned in antitrust cases: 1974, 1994, and 2007. Furthermore, we observe substantial fluctuations in the success rates of plaintiffs across various stages of litigation. Additionally, the study finds that the underlying statutory basis of cases involving economists has shifted over time, with a notable increase in Sherman Act cases and a corresponding decrease in Clayton Act and combined Clayton-Sherman Act cases.

Economic Analysis

Rule of reason

Statutory interpretation

Consent decree

Relevant market

10.2139/ssrn.4809691

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Are the bankrupt skies the friendliest?

Journal of Corporate Finance (2012)

Federico Ciliberto Carola Schenone

Competitor analysis

Financial Distress

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.07.005

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Citations (21)

Limited Access to Airport Facilities and Market Power in the Airline Industry

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (2009)

Federico Ciliberto Jonathan W. Williams

We investigate the role of limited access to airport facilities as a determinant of the hub premium in the US airline industry. We use original data from competition plans that airports are required to submit to the Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century. We collect information on the availability and control of airport gates, leasing arrangements, and other restrictions limiting the expansion of airport facilities. We �nd that the hub premium is increasing in the ticket fare. We �nd that control of gates is a crucial determinant of this premium. Limits on the fees that airlines can charge for subleasing their gates lower the prices charged by airlines. Finally, control of gates and restrictions on sublease fees explain high fares only when there is a scarcity of gates relative to the number of departures out of an airport.

Limiting

Investment

Ticket

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Citations (2)

Were British cotton entrepreneurs technologically backward? Firm-level evidence on the adoption of ring spinning

Explorations in Economic History (2010)

Federico Ciliberto

Weaving

Conservatism

10.1016/j.eeh.2009.11.002

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Citations (9)

Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry

SSRN Electronic Journal (2012)

Federico Ciliberto Jonathan W. Williams

We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. We find i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares; iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; iv) assuming firms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.

Tacit collusion

Tacit Knowledge

10.2139/ssrn.1657728

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Citations (12)

Exit from the Hospital Industry

SSRN Electronic Journal (2007)

Federico Ciliberto Richard C. Lindrooth

We study the exit of hospitals from the market for inpatient services. More generous hospital reimbursement significantly reduces the probability of exit throughout the 1990s. Conditional on reimbursement levels, hospital efficiency was not a significant determinant in the early 1990s but in the mid- to late 1990s, less efficient hospitals were significantly more likely to exit. Throughout the period, high-tech services increased the probability of survival, and for-profit hospitals were more likely to exit. The role of Medicare as a determinant of exit became less important in the latter half of the 1990s.

Reimbursement

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Citations (1)