MI DEAR MR.ALDHICH: I have your very kind invitation of tlie '¿Sth nit. to attend the ceremony of laying the Corner-stone of the Iowa Historical Bnilding.to occnrupon Wednesday, the nth inst.
This paper uses the Flow of Funds accounts to assess the impact of a monetary policy shock on the borrowing and lending activities of different sectors of the economy. Our measures of contractionary monetary policy shocks have the following properties: (i) they are associated with a fall in nonborrowed reserves, total reserves, M1, the Federal Reserves' holdings of government securities and a rise in the federal funds rate, (ii) they lead to persistent declines in real GNP, employment, retail sales and nonfinancial corporate profits as well as increases in unemployment and manufacturing inventories, (iii) they generate sharp, persistent declines in commodity prices and (iv) the GDP price deflator does not respond to them for roughly a year. After that the GDP price deflator declines. Our major findings regarding the borrowing activities of different sectors can be summarized as follows. First, following a contractionary shock to monetary policy, net funds raised by the business sector increases for roughly a year. Thereafter, as the recession induced by the policy shock gains momentum, net funds raised by the business sector begins to fall. This pattern is not captured by existing monetary business cycle models. Second, we cannot reject the view that households do not adjust their financial assets and liabilities for several quarters after a monetary shock. This is consistent with a key assumption of several recent monetary business cycle models.
We provide new evidence that models of the monetary transmission mechanism should be consistent with at least the following facts. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the aggregate price level responds very little, aggregate output falls, interest rates initially rise, real wages decline by a modest amount, and profits fall. We compare the ability of sticky price and limited participation models with frictionless labor markets to account for these facts. The key failing of the sticky price model lies in its counterfactual implications for profits. The limited participation model can account for all the above facts, but only if one is willing to assume a high labor supply elasticity (2 percent) and a high markup (40 percent). The shortcomings of both models reflect the absence of labor market frictions, such as wage contracts or factor hoarding, which dampen movements in the marginal cost of production after a monetary policy shock.
Money, Sticky Wages, and the Great Depression by Michael D. Bordo, Christopher J. Erceg and Charles L. Evans. Published in volume 90, issue 5, pages 1447-1463 of American Economic Review, December 2000
Salter Get access Charles Evans Charles Evans Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Notes and Queries, Volume CLXVIII, Issue mar23, 23 March 1935, Page 207, https://doi.org/10.1093/nq/CLXVIII.mar23.207h Published: 23 March 1935
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